diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da2e923b23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+## 2025-06-28 - [Path Traversal in API Files Get Endpoint]
+**Vulnerability:** Path traversal vulnerability in API endpoint `api/api_files_get.py`. The `paths` array allowed retrieving files outside of the intended directories when path traversal elements (e.g. `../../../`) are provided in the path or filename.
+**Learning:** `files.get_abs_path()` and `os.path.basename()` alone do not resolve paths safely against path traversal if malicious components bypass `basename()` or traverse out after `get_abs_path` resolves. A strict boundary check must be explicitly made.
+**Prevention:** Always validate that the final resolved absolute path is within the intended base directory using `files.is_in_base_dir(external_path)`.
diff --git a/api/api_files_get.py b/api/api_files_get.py
index b2533f4f4f..fbd6f1d625 100644
--- a/api/api_files_get.py
+++ b/api/api_files_get.py
@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ async def process(self, input: dict, request: Request) -> dict | Response:
                         external_path = path
                         filename = os.path.basename(path)
 
+                    # Security check: Ensure the path is within the base directory
+                    if not files.is_in_base_dir(external_path):
+                        PrintStyle.warning(f"Access denied. Path is outside of base directory: {path}")
+                        continue
+
                     # Check if file exists
                     if not os.path.exists(external_path):
                         PrintStyle.warning(f"File not found: {path}")