Ensure tree traversal attack is protected against. - #2
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…s-is http://<victim>:3000/../../../../../../home/<user>/.ssh/id_rsa
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From Claude:
Vuln 1 — Path Traversal → Arbitrary File Read: src/server.mjs:66-67 (and :20-28)
Description
The static file handler builds a filesystem path by joining the public directory with the raw request path, with no normalization
or containment check:
// src/server.mjs:66
const filePath = url === "/" ? join(PUBLIC, "index.html") : join(PUBLIC, url.slice(1));
await serveStatic(res, filePath); // serveStatic() just readFile()s it, :20-28
url is req.url.split("?")[0] — Node's HTTP server does not collapse ../ dot-segments in req.url, so a request target containing ..
reaches join() verbatim. join(PUBLIC, "../../../../etc/passwd") resolves outside PUBLIC, and serveStatic reads and returns
whatever file results. The MIME map falls back to application/octet-stream for unknown extensions, so extension-less secrets are
served fine.
Exploit Scenario
Browsers normalize ../, but an attacker doesn't use a browser. Against a victim running the tool:
curl --path-as-is http://:3000/../../../../../../etc/passwd
curl --path-as-is http://:3000/../../../../../../home//.ssh/id_rsa
curl --path-as-is http://:3000/../../../../../../home//.aws/credentials
This reads any file the running user can read — SSH keys, cloud credentials, ~/.claude/ auth material, the full transcript corpus,
etc. Combined with Vuln 2 (server binds to all interfaces), this is exploitable by anyone on the same LAN/Wi-Fi, unauthenticated.